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OPENING STATEMENTS IN JURY TRIALS:
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL LIMITS?
MICHAEL J. AHLEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
All good trial attorneys realize the importance of opening state-
ments. At very least, opening statements are an opportunity to give the
jury an idea of what the case is about,' and to outline the evidence which
will be presented. 2 Opening comments also give the jury the opportuni-
ty to study the attorneys and determine who can be trusted to help them
reach a just verdict. 3 Most litigators would agree that an effective
opening statement can be a great advantage in ultimately persuading the
jury.4 Some go as far as to say that trials are won or lost in openings.5 It
seems beyond dispute that lawyers are paying increased attention to the
importance of opening statements.6
Attorneys are being urged to be more aggressive in opening re-
marks. One litigator advises attorneys to be dramatic and "cast a spell"
during opening statements, 7 while another suggests a theme for the
defense in criminal cases to be "Attack! Attack! Attack!" 8 A nationally
prominent civil counsel suggests that attorneys use emotion-packed
language 9 and emphasize to jurors in opening that they can control the
destiny of more than just the plaintiff, but also that of the defendant and
"all truck drivers and haulage companies" in the community.' 0 Some
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I. LEONARD DECOF, ART OF ADVOCAcY- OPENING STATEMENT § 1.01 [2] (1995).
2. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62 (N.D. 1967).
3. See I FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 10.01 (Scott D. Lane ed., 1994 Supp.) (3d ed.
1984 & 1994 Supp.) (noting that opening statements can help build the jury's confidence in the
attorney's theory of the case); DECOF, supra note 1. §1.01[2] (stating that establishing trust in the
attorney can motivate the jury to find an adequate remedy).
4. See Weyman I. Lundquist, Advocacy in Opening Statements, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 425,
425 (John G. Koeltl ed., 2d ed. 1989) (noting the particular importance of first impressions in
litigation).
5. ALFRED S. JULIEN, OPENING STATEMENTS § 1.01 (1980 & 1993 Supp.).
6. DECOF, supra note 1, § 1.01.
7. Rikki J. Klieman, Opening Statements: How To Deliver a Convincing Opening in a Criminal
Defense Case. TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 41,42.
8. JULIEN, supra note 5, § 5.01.
9. Peter Perlman, The Compelling Opening Statement, TRtAL, May 1994, at 64, 64.
10. Id. at 67.
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courthouse veterans may question whether these techniques are really all
that new.
Judges seek to insure that juries reach verdicts based on the evi-
dence, not on the basis of nonevidentiary prejudicial information.' 1
The tension between attorneys and judges as to the proper scope of
opening statements seems to be long-standing,1 2 but the controversy has
intensified. There are accusations that attorneys turn opening statements
into opening arguments,1 3 filled with prejudicial comments and refer-
ences to inadmissible evidence.14 Some judges have severely restricted
attorneys' opening statements. 15 Federal trial courts in Connecticut
already have the judge, rather than attorneys, deliver opening state-
ments. 16  A federal judge in the District of Columbia has announced
that he will follow the Connecticut example in most of the trials in his
court.17
Uncertainty about the proper content of opening statements is a
significant problem for trial lawyers. The threat of causing reversible
errorl 8 or a mistriall 9 due to improper opening comments, cannot be
ignored. The threat of being stopped in the middle of opening by a
sustained objection is bothersome. Not only does the court's ruling
break up the flow of one's presentation, but it can make the attorney
11. State v. Brooks, 520 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D. 1994) (involving alleged juror misconduct by
consideration of extraneous prejudicial information during deliberations).
12. See Foster v. United States, 308 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1962) (concluding that trial court did
not err in disallowing defendant from mentioning prior acquittal for witness intimidation); Hilliard v.
United States, 121 F.2d 992,995-96 (4th Cir. 1941 ), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941) (determining it
was not error to allow reference to some inadmissible evidence which attorney attempted to offer and
judge gave a cautionary instruction).
13. United States v. Smyth, 842 F. Supp. 20,21 n.3 (D. D.C. 1994) (denying defendant's proposed
individual theories of defense).
14. Compare Sutton v. Overcash, 623 N.E.2d 820, 835-38 (11. App. Ct. 1993) (involving opening
statements and commentary throughout trial by defense which made unsupported attacks on the
plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit that took plaintiff 31 pages to outline on appeal); with Tucker v.
State, 646 N.E.2d 972, 976-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (alleging misconduct when prosecutor informed
the jury during opening statements in a fraud case that the defendant was a convicted child molester
and falsely pictured victim as an 82-year old great-grandmotherly widow).
15. See United States v. Thomas, 1994 U. S. App. LEXIs 32669 at *11 (6th Cir. November 15,
1992) (per curium) (determining that the defense was prohibited from significant discussion in opening
statements about prosecution witness' questionable credibility when entire defense rested on attacking
that witness' credibility); State v. Flaaen, 863 S.W.2d 658. 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to allow
the defendant to attack the credibility of a key government witness in opening).
16. United States v. Young and Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp 334, 352-53 (D. Conn. 1990).
17. United States v. Smyth, 842 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.3 (D. D.C. 1994). The judge in Smyth, stated
that he would "deny oral opening statements to both sides in most cases, receiving instead written
statements from counsel to be edited and then read by the Court to the jury along with preliminary
instructions at the start of trial." Id.
18. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981)
(reversing conviction for improper comments in prosecutor's opening statement).
19. State v. Levison, 510 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Neb. 1993) (granting mistrial because of defense
counsel's opening remark that a case on the same charge had earlier been dismissed).
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look incompetent, or even unethical, in the eyes of jurors at the very time
that attorneys are hoping to create the best impression. 20 If the sustained
objection is followed by an admonition or forced retraction, the impact
is even worse. 2 1 On the other hand, if the attorney goes too far in an
effort to avoid objections, the opening statement may be dull and
ineffective. It is therefore imperative to strike some kind of balance.
Improper opening remarks pose a serious problem for the party
against whom they are directed. Some North Dakota judges do not like
objections to opening statements. 22 If the victim objects and loses, then
the objector may appear incompetent, or worse, as someone who is
trying to keep the jury from hearing the facts. The mere act of object-
ing may also highlight the improper remark for the jury. On the other
hand, if the objection is sustained, a quick assessment of damage needs
to be made, as well as a determination as to whether to seek a curative
instruction, and in the case of serious injury, a motion for mistrial made.
Preserving the issue of improper argument for appeal often requires not
only a timely objection, but a request for a curative instruction, and
sometimes a motion for mistrial or other post-objection procedures. 23
With the national controversy over the proper scope and content of
openings, a review of North Dakota law seems in order. This viewpoint
will consider what the legal limits of opening statements are, and the
remedies available when improper comments are made. It will also offer
some suggestions about how attorneys can use existing procedures to
better cope with the problems of opening statements.
II. NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF OPENING STATEMENTS
A. THE PURPOSE OF OPENING STATEMENTS
1. Background
Rule 6.2 of the North Dakota Rules of Court provides:
20. See generally DECOF, supra note 1, § 1.15 (noting that promising not to mislead the jury and
recording opening statements leads to better litigating because attorneys want to maintain a good
impression in the jurors' eyes).
21. See South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 834-35 (N.D. 1980) (forcing
attorney to admit to the jury that his prior statement was improper by demanding a retraction).
22. Over the past 14 years, the majority of North Dakota's district judges have been to University
of North Dakota School of Law to help with student mock trials. Most encourage students to raise
objections to improper argument during opening statements, but a few actively discourage objections
during openings.
23. For further discussion of preserving and avoiding improper argument in opening statements,
see infra part III.
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After the jury is impaneled and sworn and the trial is ready to
proceed, counsel for the plaintiff may make an opening
statement to the jury. Counsel for the defendant may immedi-
ately follow with an opening statement to the jury or defer it
until the plaintiff has rested.
Rule 6.224 is silent as to the purpose and content of opening state-
ments. Such guidance, as is available, is found in the common law.
Rather surprisingly, North Dakota decisions do not set forth a
specific statement of the purpose of opening statements for parties in a
civil action, or defendants in criminal cases. The only clear holding
regarding the purpose of opening statements is with regard to the
prosecutor's opening in criminal cases, as first set out in State v.
Marmon.25
The purpose of an opening statement is to inform the jury what
the case is all about and to outline to it the proof which the
State expects to present, so that the jurors may more intelligent-
ly follow the testimony as it is presented. In such statement,
counsel for the State should outline what he intends to prove,
and it is not necessary that he name the witnesses who will
present each bit of evidence. In outlining his proposed case,
counsel should be allowed considerable latitude. Only where
the prosecutor deliberately attempts to misstate the evidence
will such opening statement be ground for reversible error. 26
By defining the purpose of a prosecuting attorney's opening
statement, but not defining the purpose of openings for criminal defend-
ants or either party to a civil suit, we are left with the question, should the
purpose of opening statement be the same for all parties in all types of
cases?
2. Jurors' Understanding
The first element of the Marmon standard-that opening statement is
to inform the jury what the case is all about- 27 is nationally accepted and
applied to opening statements of all parties. 28 The whole purpose of
opening statements is to give the jury some background of the case so
that they can better understand the evidence which they are about to see
24. N.D. R. Cr. 6.2.
25. 154 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1967).
26. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62 (N.D. 1967).
27. Id.
28. See DECOF, supra note 1, § 2.01; LANE, supra note 3, § 10.04; JuLmN supra note 5, § IA.01.
704 [VOL. 71:701
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and hear. 29 Real injustice can result if jurors do not have any back-
ground for evaluating what they are seeing and hearing.
An example from the case of United States v. Rubino30 is helpful in
understanding why the rule is necessary. 31 Rubino was charged with tax
evasion for four years.32 The government intended to prove the amount
of Rubino's real income through the net worth and nondeductible
expenditures method of proof; an accounting method with which most
jurors have no familiarity. 33 In net worth trials, the prosecution brings in
many witnesses with hundreds of documents to show how much the
taxpayer spent during the four year period.34 It usually takes weeks, and
sometimes months, for the government to put all of these business and
personal records in evidence. 35 After weeks of testimony about small
and large purchases, on the very last day of its case, the Government puts
an expert witness on the stand to testify as to what all those records mean
as far as the income of the taxpayer is concerned. Up until that time,
juries often have no idea why they were hearing so much boring and
apparently meaningless information.
You can imagine what jurors do when going through weeks of
testimony about canceled checks and bank ledgers. They get bored,
sleep, become angry, and do everything except what jurors are supposed
to do-concentrate on the evidence. In Rubino, however, the trial judge
allowed the prosecutor to use his opening statement to explain the net
worth method of proof, and the purpose of all the checks, invoices, and
other records that the jurors would be seeing.3 6 A chart showing how the
net worth method of proof worked was allowed to be used in opening
with the explanation that this was only a demonstration for illustrative
purposes and not the net worth of the defendant. 37 Now the jury had
something to help them understand what they were seeing during those
weeks of trial. They could act as jurors were supposed to under the
Marmon38 rationale. It also demonstrates Marmon's grant of consider-
able latitude in how its purpose is to be met.
29. Id.
30. 431 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
31. United States v. Rubino, 431 F.2d 284,290 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
32. Id. at 285.
33. Id. at 290.
34. See id. at 290 (recognizing net worth-expenditures method as a way to prove a taxpayer's
income and jurors' difficulty in comprehension).
35. See id at 286 (describing the trial which continued from November 18. 1968 to January 29,
1969, as lengthy).
36. Rubino, 431 F.2d at 290.
37. Id. at 289-90.
38. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62 (N.D. 1967). See supra text accompanying note 26
(stating the Marmon purpose).
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3. Outlining Evidence
The second element of the Marmon standard, outlining the evidence
which the attorney expects to present, 39 is generally well-recognized, 40
but should not be applied to all defendants, especially in criminal cases.
Parties with the burden of proof have little trouble outlining the
evidence which they intend to produce. 4 1 Since they generally must
produce their evidence first, they are ready to tell the jury what they will
present at the start of trial. Defendants, on the other hand, particularly in
criminal cases, may not know what evidence that they will present at the
time the other party's opening statement concludes, or whether they will
present any evidence at all.42 They may simply do nothing, or only
cross examine the other party's witnesses. 43
Defendants have a right to reserve opening comments until after the
prosecution has presented its case, 44 but waiting is considered risky, as
jurors may attach undue weight to the other party's case without first
hearing anything from the defense.45
If the defense must give some type of opening statement to the jury
immediately after the other party's opening, and the defense isn't sure
whether it will put on witnesses, the only "safe" opening statement may
be to remind the jury of the burden of proof and attack the other party's
proposed evidence. 46 If the defense promises to produce evidence or
certain witnesses in opening statement, and then fails to deliver, the
defense's credibility will greatly suffer by the time the other party
reminds the jurors of the defense's broken promises in closing argu-
ment.47 It would seem that the defense should be able to inform the
jury of the nature of the defense even if it calls no witnesses.
In some jurisdictions, there have been substantial battles over restric-
tions placed on a defendant's ability to attack the other party's evidence
in opening statement in both criminal 48 and civil cases, 49 but the over-
39. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d at 62.
40. See DECOF, supra note 1, § 2.01; LANE, supra note 3, § 10.04; JULIEN supra note 5, § 1A.01.
41. RoGER HAYDOCK & JoHN SoNsTENG. ADVOCACY OPENING AND CLOsING: How To PRESENT A CASE
§ 2.12 (1994).
42. Id. §2.14.
43. Id.
44. N.D. R. Cr. 6.2.
45. HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 41, § 2.14; see also DECOF, supra note 1, § 2.02 (noting the
greater weight placed on an opening statement if left uncontradicted).
46. See J ULIEN, supra note 5, §§ 5.01. 6A.06 (stating that the opening statement of the defense in
a criminal case should be an aggressive reminder of the importance of safeguards, such as the high
burden of proof of the prosecution).
47. LANE, supra note 3, §10.62.
48. E.g., State v. Harris. 839 S.W.2d 54, 68 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 1368 (1993)
(finding no reversible error by the trial court for refusing the defendant an opportunity to comment on
prosecuting attorney's opening statement, although the interruption may have been premature); State
706 [VOL. 71:701
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whelming majority of such cases are criminal. If the court imposes a
Marmon-like restriction on a defendant, allowing the attorney to go only
so far as outlining the evidence defendant will produce, then the defend-
ant has no real opening statement.5 0
A Montana attorney may have best illustrated the frustration which
some defense counsel have, when he delivered the following complete
opening statement after being denied the opportunity to mention the
burden of proof, presumption of innocence, or the evidence discussed
by the prosecuting attorney:
Ladies and gentlemen, I have merely a short statement to make
to you. I would ask that you listen to the evidence carefully,
and that you listen also to not only what you do hear, but also
to what you do not hear, because it is the position of the
defendant that the State of Montana cannot prove each and
every element of this charge. Thank you.Sl
Surely Marmon was not intended to prohibit parties from giving
juries a basic understanding of their defenses. By refusing to apply such
a strict standard against defense openings, North Dakota enables the
defense to make a meaningful opening. However, if the defense at-
tempts to abuse its freedom, the judge can impose restrictions.5 2 This
practice seems to work. It is significant that North Dakota has not
experienced well-grounded civil or criminal appeals from any party
claiming undue restriction in opening, and there are very few cases
holding that a party went too far in opening statement.5 3
There is limited utility in writing a special purpose clause to cover
defense openings. States which have adopted rules governing the scope
of defense openings have certainly not avoided substantial appeals
concerning alleged unfair restrictions on opening statements.54
v. Mash, 399 S.E.2d 307, 310 (N.C. 1991) (noting that it is not the purpose of opening statement to
allow the parties to comment on the other side's evidence).
49. E.g., Williams v. Wise, 476 P.2d 145, 146-47 (Ariz. 1970) (refusing to allow one defendant to
discuss issues which the other defendant had discussed in opening).
50. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 1994 U.S. App. LEXiS 32669 at *11 (6th Cir. November 15,
1992) (per curium) (prohibiting the defense from setting forth facts in opening to attempt to
demonstrate that the prosecution witness' credibility was questionable, upon which the entire defense
rested).
51. State v. Martinez, 613 P.2d 974,977 (Mont. 1980) (vacating the conviction on other grounds).
52. See infra part II.C.
53. See infra parts II.B and U.C.
54. E.g., People v. Childress, 633 N.E.2d 635,650 (I11. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 215 (1994).
Illinois has one of the higher rates of appeal on the issue of improper restriction of opening statements,
despite a broader statement of purpose. The Childress decision outlined the purpose as: "The
purpose of an opening statement is to advise the jury concerning the question of fact involved, to
prepare their minds for the evidence to be heard and give them an idea of the nature of the action and
defense." Id. (quoting the trial court judge's ruling on an objection during opening statements).
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B. DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT
The control and scope of opening statements and closing arguments
is largely a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. 55 The trial
court maintains control over the substance and vigor of opening state-
ments .56
Trial courts also have substantial discretion with regard to available
remedies when improper comments are made. The trial court's ruling
on a motion for mistrial will not be reversed unless a manifest injustice
appears. 57 The trial court's determination to grant or deny new trials by
reason of misconduct of counsel will not be reversed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion. 58 Other sanctions include sustaining objections
and issuing curative instructions, forced retraction of improper remarks,
and sanctions against the offending attorney. 59
There are several good reasons for investing the trial court with such
discretionary powers. The variety of issues present in trials is infinite,
and it would be impossible to design wise rules which would govern all
possible combinations of issues likely to arise in openings. The trial
court is obviously in a better position to judge the impact of improper
remarks on the jury than the appellate court because it can view the jury.
Finally, the limited number of appeals based on improper opening
statements indicates that in North Dakota, the discretion appears to be
wisely used.
C. DEFINING IMPROPER OPENING STATEMENTS
Rather than defining what are proper subjects of opening state-
ments, North Dakota decisions concentrate on what is improper. The
following categories of cases stand as a clear warning of the danger areas
in opening.
1. Arguing in Opening Statement
Courts in North Dakota, 60 and most other jurisdictions, 61 do sustain
objections to argumentative opening comments. This objection appears
raised more than any other with regard to opening statements, 62 and yet
55. State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335, 342 (N.D. 1987) (referring to opening statements,
although the court spoke of opening arguments).
56. Id.
57. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W. 2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987).
58. Id.
59. See infra part II.D.
60. E.g., State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 728 (N.D. 1967) (sustaining an objection for
argument, but denying motion for mistrial by the trial court; decision upheld).
61. DECOF, supra note 1, § 2.03[2][d].
62. This conclusion comes from listening to the many North Dakota judges who work with
708 [VOL. 71:701
LEGAL LIMITS FOR OPENING STATEMENTS
American courts have not provided clear guidance on what constitutes
improper argument. 63 It appears that the objection for arguing is a
catch-all for any improper remark. 64 Such a catch-all is probably
necessary because no person has yet been able to set out all of the ways
in which attorneys have made improper remarks in opening statements.65
Clearly, an attempt to give closing argument in opening statement is
improper. 66 Parties should go only as far as reasonably necessary to
assist the jury in understanding what the case is about so that they can
understand the evidence yet to be received. 67
While objections for arguing are common at the trial level, they
have been rare subjects on appeal. North Dakota's only reported
decision showing a trial court sustaining an objection for argumentative
remarks is not very informative. In State v. Loyland,68 an aggravated
reckless driving case, the prosecutor told the jury in opening that "[w]e
will further show by competent evidence that the defendant's car, when
pulled out of the ditch where it came to rest, contained empty, full and
partially full beer cans." 69  Although the trial court sustained the de-
fense objection to the remarks, the State proved the allegations through
testimony without getting the cans in evidence. 70 It is not clear just what
part of the opening was "argumentative." The appellate decision
affirming the conviction found nothing improper in the prosecutor's
statements, or the admission of the testimony about the cans. 71 The
information which the trial court would not allow to be used in opening
statement would appear to qualify under the Marmon standard as help-
ful. 72
Attorneys opposing improper remarks will be more successful in
winning an argument objection if they can prove the evidence does not
meet the Marmon criteria, and that it might interfere with the jury's work
by causing the jury to base its verdict on something other than the
evidence.
students, as well as personal observation.
63. DECOF, supra note 1. § 2.03[2][d] (noting that opening statements are a cross between
presentation and argument).
64. See Abraham P. Ordover, Persuasion and the Opening Statement in THE LmATION MANUAL
432 (John G. ed., Koeltl 2d ed. 1989) (providing a short list of statements generally constituting undue
argument).
65. United States v. Smyth, 842 F. Supp. 20,21 & n.3 (D. D.C. 1994) (deeming it argumentative to
mention that co-counsel for the defense were married with three children).
66. See JULIEN, supra note 5, § 1A.01 (stating that the opening is an introductory outline and
should not be used as a substitute for other portions of the trial).
67. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62 (N.D. 1967).
68. 149 N.W.2d 713, 728 (N.D. 1967).
69. State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713,728 (N.D. 1967).
70. Id. at 730.
71. Id.
72. See supra text accompanying note 26 (describing the Marmon standard).
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North Dakota's law regarding argument in opening statements,
however, is not made easier by the fact that some courts use the terms
"opening statement" and "opening argument" interchangeably. 73
The suggestion that attorneys should not argue in openings, regard-
less of whether termed "opening statement" or "opening argument," is
implied in State v. Houle.74 In denying the defendant's claim that he
was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to grant a motion for change
of venue due to pretrial publicity, the court noted that the pretrial news
accounts were much the same as what the jurors would be given when the
complaint was read and the jury was given basic factual accounts. 75
Implied in the court's comments is the conclusion that the attorneys
comments in opening statement will be statements of the facts of the case
without prejudicial comments by the attorneys.
2. Reference to Evidence Not Produced
If a party promises evidence in opening statement, but fails to
produce it, there is a potential danger that the jury will reach a decision
based on the lawyer's words. Failure to call an important witness who
had been referred to in opening statement, however, is not error so long
as other evidence supports the matters discussed in the prosecutor's open-
ing, and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, or any deliberate
attempt to misstate the facts.76 In outlining the State's case, the prosecut-
ing attorney should be allowed considerable latitude.77
A much more serious matter is when counsel simply does not have
the evidence that the attorney claimed to have in opening statement. For
example, a claim that evidence would be presented by a witness who
would testify that the employees of the defendant had been drinking
could not be established through the witness, or apparently by any other
witness. 78 The attorney was therefore forced to retract the misleading
opening remarks in open court with the jury present.79
3. Reference to Inadmissible Evidence
It is very dangerous for an attorney to refer to inadmissible evi-
dence in opening statement. Perhaps the most dangerous remarks are
73. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp,, 290 N.W.2d 819, 834 (N.D. 1980).
74. 293 N.W.2d 872,874 (N.D. 1980).
75. State v. Houle, 293 N.W.2d 872, 874 (N.D. 1980).
76. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62-63 (N.D. 1967).
77. Id. at 62.
78. See South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W. 819, 834-35 (N.D. 1980) (receiving a
sworn signed statement from a key witness denying any knowledge of employees drinking after
opening statements had been given).
79. Id.
710 [VOL. 71:701
LEGAL LIMITS FOR OPENING STATEMENTS
those relating to inadmissible criminal convictions of a party or an
associate of a party.
In State v. Welch,80 the prosecutor mentioned in opening that a
girlfriend of the defendant had been convicted of being the defendant's
accomplice in the crime for which the defendant stood trial.81 The
comment was clearly improper because it suggested guilt by associa-
tion.82 The trial court sustained the objection, but did not give a caution-
ary instruction.8 3 The conviction was affirmed although the North
Dakota Supreme Court suggested that the better course of action would
have been to declare a mistrial.8 4 The defendant waived the objection to
the statement by failing to request a cautionary instruction.8 5 The failure
of the trial court to give a cautionary instruction on its own motion was
found not to be obvious error.8 6
In State v. Robideaux,87 a defendant complained that the prosecu-
tion's opening statement improperly advised jurors of a prior conviction
of the defendant.88 The court compared the fault of both attorneys in
opening statement, and found that the complaining party was the most at
fault.8 9 The defendant was on trial for negligent homicide, and had
earlier pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of the accident in the same
matter.90 It was not improper for the prosecuting attorney to make very
brief reference to the fact that after the accident, the defendant "left." 91
The prosecution did not tell of the prior conviction, nor did any prose-
cution witness. 92 The defense counsel's opening did advise the jury of
the guilty plea, and therefore the defendant could not complain of
prejudice .93Comment on the other party's criminal record is sometimes permis-
sible. In Clark v. Josephson,94 a civil case involving an automobile
accident, it was not error for the plaintiff's attorney to include in open-
ing statement a reference to the defendant's conviction for drunken
driving in connection with the accident which was the subject of the
80. 426 N.W.2d 550 (N.D. 1988).
81. State v. Welch, 426 N.W.2d 550,552 (N.D. 1988).
82. Id. at 553.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 555.
85. Id. at 553.
86. Welch, 426 N.W.2d at 554.
87. 493 N.W.2d 210 (N.D. 1992).
88. State v. Robideaux, 493 N.W.2d 210,213-14 (N.D. 1992).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 211.
91. Id. at 213-14.
92. Id. at 213.
93. Robideaux, 493 N.W.2d at 214.
94. 66 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1954).
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case. 95  The trial court had instructed the jury to disregard remarks by
counsel concerning any alleged criminal proceedings. 96 The appellate
court also noted earlier in the opinion that the defendant's guilty plea
should have been admissible as a statement against interest. 97
Reference in opening statement to the confession of another defen-
dant in a case completely unrelated to the trial, for the illustrative pur-
pose of explaining the difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence, was not highly prejudicial. 98 Any harm to the defendant was
cured by the court's admonition to ignore the comments. 99
In Lange v. Cusey,100 a civil matter involving a vehicle accident,
reference to inadmissible evidence in opening statement called for a new
trial to be ordered.lOl The defendant's attorney informed the jury in
opening that his client had driven trucks over 2,000,000 miles without
having an accident, implying that he had the character trait of being a
careful driver which violated Rules 404 and 608 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence. 102 Later in the trial, he violated the same rules by
remarking that the plaintiff had the character trait of being a bad driv-
er. 103 On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined to second-
guess the trial court's determination that the remarks tainted the ver-
dict. 104
Improper remarks pertaining to inadmissible evidence do not
always result in relief from the jury verdict. In Allen v. Kleven ,105 a civil
personal injury case, the attorney for the defendant and third-party
plaintiff advised the jury in opening statement that the plaintiff and third
party-defendant were romantically involved, and that this was the reason
that the boyfriend had not also been sued. 106 The plaintiff objected and
the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the
remarks. 107 Later, defense counsel cross-examined one of plaintiff's
witnesses in an effort to prove that the witness was lying because of a
former relationship with the plaintiff.108 Again the court sustained the
95. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (N.D. 1954).
96. Id. at 544.
97. Id. at 543.
98. State v. Thiel, 515 N.W.2d 186, 189 (N.D. 1994).
99. Id.
100. 379 N.W.2d 775 (N.D. 1985).
101. Lange v. Cusey, 379 N.W.2d 775, 776-77 (N.D. 1985).
102. Id. See also N.D. R. EvID. 404 & 608 (containing relevant language of the rules regarding
character trait evidence).
103. Lange, 379 N.W.2d at 777.
104. Id.
105. 306 N.W. 2d 629 (N.D. 1981).
106. Allen v. Kleven, 306 N.W. 2d 629,631-32 (N.D. 1981).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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plaintiff's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remarks. 109
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the totality of the improper conduct of
defense counsel in opening statement and cross-examination was so
great as to be prejudicial.110 Although it found that defendant's counsel
had attempted to prejudice the jury, the trial court's reaction in sustain-
ing objections and instructing the jury to disregard the improper com-
ments was found to be reasonable and was all that could have been
expected.111 The plaintiff had not raised the issue of the combined
effect of counsel's improper conduct at the trial level, and thus could not
raise the issue for the first time on appeal.'12
Appellate relief has also been withheld when the plaintiff's opening
remarks related to evidence which was not held inadmissible until after
opening statement was completed.113 During opening statement, plain-
tiff's attorney quoted from the deposition of a defendant."l 4 A portion
of the quoted material included an admission that one of the reasons that
the defendant did not cover the injured plaintiff with his jacket following
the accident was that the defendant didn't want to get his new fifty-five
dollar jacket bloody.115 After opening statements, the trial court ex-
cluded the portion of the testimony with regard to the engineer not
wanting to get his jacket bloody, because its prejudicial effect out-
weighed its probative value. 116 Other admissions concerning his failure
to assist were admitted.11 7 The court held that in view of the trial court's
giving the jury the standard instructions advising that the remarks of
attorneys were not evidence and that any comments not supported by the
evidence were to be wholly disregarded, plaintiff's opening remarks
were not prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial.118
Of course, an appeal on the ground that opening statement con-
tained references to inadmissible evidence will fail if the court finds that
the evidence is in fact admissible. 119
109. Id.
110. Id. at 633.
111. Allen, 306 N.W.2d at 635-36.
112. Id.
113. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W. 2d 819, 835-36 (N.D. 1980).
114. Id. at 835.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. South, 290 N.W.2d at 837.
119. E.g., State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 729 (N.D. 1967) (determining that opening
statement reference to beer cans at the scene of the arrest was substantiated by testimony of a witness
at trial, thus was not prejudicial).
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3. Inflammatory Remarks
It is generally held that inflammatory language should not be used
in voir dire, opening statements or closing arguments.1 20 In State v.
Mehralian,121 a case involving highly prejudicial remarks about the
defendant's nationality and religion during voir dire and closing at the
height of Iranian Hostage crisis, the North Dakota Supreme Court had
no hesitation in reversing the conviction.122 There is no reason to think
that the outcome would have been any different if the remarks had
occurred in opening statement rather than voir dire.
However, not all potentially prejudicial language will lead to a
mistrial or reversal. In State v. Kaiser,123 a prosecution for terrorizing,
the prosecuting attorney asked in closing argument if it would be
necessary to wait until the victim's body was brought into court before
the evidence was sufficient to convict. 124 Although it held that there was
no abuse of discretion with regard to the trial court's denial of the
motion for mistrial and subsequent denial of a new trial, the reviewing
court made clear its disapproval of prejudicial remarks. The remarks
would have been just as improper in opening.125
The objection to inflammatory remarks will obviously not succeed
where the court finds that the alleged inflammatory remarks were
actually a fair statement of admissible evidence. 126 In State v. Bossart,127
the prosecutor referred to evidence that the defendants were associated
with a gang which had committed a crime not charged in the case on
trial. 128 The uncharged crime was found to be so intertwined with the
crime at issue that it was necessary to refer to both crimes and hence
there was no error in the opening.129
4. Statements of the Law
In a case involving improper closing argument, the court noted that
if statements of the law had been pertinent to the issues, it was within the
120. See State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379-80 (N.D. 1987) (discussing remarks made during
closing arguments).
121. 301 N.W.2d 409 (N.D. 1981).
122. State v. Mehralian. 301 N.W.2d 409,418-19 (N.D. 1981) (discussing prejudicial remarks in
voir dire and closing arguments, such as evidence not substantiated).
123. 417 N.W.2d 376 (N.D. 1987).
124. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987).
125. See id. at 380 (Levine, J., concurring specially) (noting that the remarks were "off-base and
created serious error").
126. State v. Bossart, 240 N.W 606,608 (N.D. 1932).
127. 240 N.W 606, 608 (N.D. 1932).
128. State v. Bossart, 240 N.W. 606, 608 (N.D. 1932).
129. Id.
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province of the court to state the law, and not the attorney. 130 The same
logic could be applied to statements of the law in opening statement, and
such holding has been made in other jurisdictions.'131
Counsel have escaped reversal when a comment on the law was
correct. For example, the prosecuting attorney in a securities law case
told the jury in opening that there was no dispute that the defendant did
not register himself or his promissory notes. 132 The only question was
whether he should have registered them. 133 The comments were held
not to be prejudicial because the notes were securities as a matter of
law.134
A strong case can be made for having the trial court give prelimi-
nary instructions as to applicable law before opening statements and then
allowing attorneys to relate the law to the evidence which will be present-
ed. In many cases, the entire defense is based on the burden of proof,
and in criminal cases, on reasonable doubt. A jury simply cannot under-
stand the defense unless they have some preliminary help as to the law.
In negligence cases, the jury has a similar need to understand the law of
defenses to negligence. It appears that in some North Dakota courts,
attorneys are allowed to make some comments on the law as early as voir
dire.135
5. References to Defendants Not Testifying in Criminal Cases
Defendants in criminal cases have often alleged that the prosecu-
tor's opening statement amounts to a comment on the defendant's
failure to testify. This violates the United State's Supreme Court holding
in Griffen v. California.136 Prosecutors are deemed not to comment on
the defendant's failure to take the stand in opening, because comments
in opening statement are made before the defendant has an opportunity
to take the stand.137 The prosecuting attorney should take care, however,
130. State v. Gulke, 38 N.W. 2d 653, 726 (N.D. 1949).
131. For additional authority of statement of the law in openings, see cases collected in JULIEN,
supra note 5, § IA.06.
132. State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1. 14 (N.D. 1981).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Personal observation of civil and criminal trials has indicated attorneys often discuss burden
of proof during voir dire.
136. 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965).
137. State v. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D. 1995) (determining that the comments were
made during opening statements, thus not infringing on the defendant's constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination); State v. Flohr, 310 N.W. 2d 735, 736-37 (N.D. 1981) (stating the general principle
that prosecutors may not comment on defendants' failure to testify on their own behalf as it implicates
the privilege against self incrimination).
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that opening remarks cannot be construed as a challenge to take the
stand. 138
In State v. Kroeplin,139 the defendant was not prejudiced by her own
counsel's comments in opening statement to the effect that she would
not testify.140 Counsel had promised the jury during voir dire that the
defendant would testify.141 When it became apparent that she could not
testify, counsel properly informed the jury of that fact during opening
statement, and the trial court instructed the jury that no inferences should
be drawn from the defendant's choice not to testify.142
6. Combinations of Error
Reversal due solely to improper opening statements or closing
arguments is rare; however, when prejudicial remarks in opening or voir
dire are combined with other errors at trial, a finding of prejudicial error
is more likely.143
D. REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER COMMENTS
Improper remarks may result in an order for a new trial, where
counsel's comments have tainted a verdict. 144 The trial court is in a
unique position to observe the impact of the remarks, and the appellate
court will only reverse for a manifest abuse of discretion. 145
Dismissal is not a proper remedy for improper opening remarks;
the proper motion would be a motion for a mistrial. 146 "The granting
of a mistrial is an extreme remedy which should be resorted to only
when there is a fundamental defect or occurrence in the proceedings that
makes it evident that further proceedings would be productive of mani-
fest injustice."'147
As extreme as the remedy of a mistrial is, it is sometimes warranted.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has suggested that when the prosecut-
ing attorney jeopardized the integrity of the proceedings in opening
138. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d at 273.
139. 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1978).
140. State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537, 543 (N.D. 1978).
141. Id. at 543.
142. Id. at 542-43.
143. See, e.g., Hunder v. Rindlaub, 237 NW. 915, 924 (N.D. 1931) (determining that error in
admitting inadmissible evidence was more harmful because of the prominent reference to the
evidence in opening statement); State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418-19 (N.D. 1981) (making
highly prejudicial remarks about the defendant's religion and nationality may have been more
prejudicial because they were raised not only in voir dire, but also in closing argument).
144. Lange v. Cusey, 379 N.W.2d 775, 778 (N.D. 1985).
145. Id. at 777.
146. State v. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d 271,273 (N.D. 1995).
147. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987) (citing State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d
335, 340 (N.D. 1987).
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statement by referring to an inadmissible conviction of the defendant's
accomplice, it would be better to grant the mistrial than to wait and see if
the evidence overcame the injection of prejudice.148 Nevertheless, upon
finding that the defendant received a fair trial, the court found no abuse
of discretion in the trial court's action. 149
Curative instructions are the most commonly-used remedy for
improper comments during opening. A jury is presumed to follow the
trial court's admonition, 150 although there is a danger that the jury may
not be able to disregard some comments. 151 Failure to request curative
instructions, however, waives the objection to the statements. 152
An attorney may also be forced to retract prejudicial remarks made
in opening statements for which there is an insufficient basis.1 53  The
recorded retraction occurs immediately after the conclusion of open-
ings. 154 It is not known if a retraction could be forced later in the trial if
it turned out that opening remarks had no basis, but the opponent will
certainly point out the failure to prove what was promised when closing
argument is made.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has indicated that an attorney
might be personally sanctioned for misconduct in closing argument,155
and the same sanctions would seem appropriate if there was severe
misconduct in openings.
E. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON OPENING STATEMENTS
Care must be taken that a party's opening statement does not ease
the way for admissibility of an opponent's evidence. Attacking the
credibility of an opponent's witness by an express or implied charge of
recent fabrication, improper influence, or motive in opening statement
may open the door to admission of prior consistent statements by that
witness. 156 Minimizing the extent of injury to a victim may also open
the door to gory photographs showing the true extent of the injury. 157
148. State v. Welch, 426 N.W.2d 550, 555 (N.D. 1988).
149. Id.
150. State v. Thiel, 515 N.W.2d 186, 189 (N.D. 1994).
151. Welch, 426 N.W.2d at 553.
152. Id.
153. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819.834-35 (N.D. 1980).
154. Id. at 834.
155. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716. 731 n.21 (N.D. 1986) (noting that sanctions can be
used to deter inappropriate conduct).
. 156. State v. Burgard 458 N.W.2d 274, 279 (N.D. 1990); N.D. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(ii). See State
v. Reinart 440 N.W.2d 503, 507 (N.D. 1989) (stating that attorney's reference to prior statements by a
witness during counsel's opening statements allowed for the rebuttal).
157. See State v. Miller 466 N.W.2d 128. 131 (N.D. 1991) (admitting photos at trial to show
extent of injury after attorney referred to a large gash as a "slight graze" in opening statements).
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Of course, attorneys lose credibility if they over-promise, and threat
of that sanction may be most important of all the limitations on the
content of opening statements.
F. PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IMPROPER REMARKS
To assure that the issue of improper opening statement is preserved
for appeal, counsel should request the court reporter to record open-
ing,158 and object to the comments at the time that they were made.
Mere failure to record opening statement, absent allegations of error
occurring during the opening, is insufficient to afford a criminal defen-
dant post-conviction relief.159
The failure to request a cautionary instruction waives the objection
to a prosecutor's allegedly prejudicial statement. 160 At the time of the
ruling on cautionary instructions, the lawyer should determine whether
to request a mistrial. Failure to request a mistrial might be seen as a
concession that the curative instruction was sufficient to remove pre-
judice.
Failure to win on issues of objection, cautionary instruction, or
mistrial does not end the need to remain alert to the issue of preserving
matters for appeal.
While the improper remarks in opening statement might, not by
themselves, be grounds sufficient to require the granting of a mistrial,
inappropriate opening comments combined with other improper con-
duct during the course of the trial might be sufficient grounds for relief.
The issue of the effect of combined error must first be raised at the trial
court, and cannot initially be raised on appeal.161
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR AVOIDING PROBLEMS IN OPENING
STATEMENT
Reading through the hundreds of cases concerning allegations of
improper opening statements, it becomes obvious that most of the
mistakes made in court could have been avoided. Following four steps
could prevent most opening statement problems:
1. Attorneys should review their openings before they are
delivered. Many of the appellate decisions rest on references
to evidence which turned out to be inadmissible. A hard-nosed
158. State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47, 51 (N.D. 1983).
159. State v. Jensen, 333 N.W.2d 686,693 (N.D. 1983).
160. State v. Welch, 426 N.W.2d 550, 553-54 (N.D. 1988).
161. Allen v. Kleven, 306 N.W.2d 629,635-36 (N.D. 1981).
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look at what really is admissible and confining remarks only to
those items, will prevent most adverse rulings.
2. Pretrial rulings on questionable matters discussed in
opening statements makes a great deal of sense. Consider the
position of the trial judge who is asked to rule on an objection
during the middle of one party's opening. The court probably
had no advance warning of the problem, and time for research
is very limited. There is continuing growth in decided cases
which could not only have helped the court, but also counsel.
There is simply not enough time to adequately consider many
objections without so delaying opening that the jury forgets
what was said before the objection.
3. Counsel should not assume that just because few trials
have ended in mistrial because of opening remarks, that
basically "anything goes" in opening. One of the reasons for
the low rate of mistrials has been that of the appealed cases in
North Dakota, most didn't involve comments that were tremen-
dously prejudicial. Where comments are highly prejudicial, the
court has not hesitated to act. When less prejudicial remarks
are made, and then combined with other prejudice during the
trial, the sum of all the prejudice may cause a court to act.
4. Have opening statements and voir dire recorded. This is
not common practice in all North Dakota courts, and may not
be appreciated by judges and court reporters. Nevertheless, it
is very difficult to appeal improper remarks without a record.
IV. CONCLUSION
An effective opening statement is an essential aid to the jury's
understanding of the evidence which will follow. There will always be a
tension between the advocate's desire to use openings to help win cases,
and the judge's role of assuring that verdicts are based on the evidence,
and not solely on the remarks of attorneys.
There will never be a complete list of rules of opening statements
which will advise attorneys of what they can do in opening, but there are
increasing guidelines of what attorneys may not say in opening state-
ments. The conventional wisdom has been that before delivering open-
ing, attorneys should get to know their trial judge. That is still good
advice, but attorneys also need to get to know their appellate courts. If
history is any indication, the number of guidelines concerning what
cannot be done in opening statements will undoubtedly grow, but there
will also have to be considerable latitude for increasingly complex cases.
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For all of the problems involved with opening statements, is there
any trial attorney who would opt for the Connecticut federal trial proce-
dures that have the judge deliver openings? Is there any client who
believes that an impartial judge could adequately allow the jury to know
something as personal and as important as what the client's case is really
all about? Our clients should hope that attorney-delivered opening
statements, even with their problems, will continue for many years to
come.
